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HAMDI V. RUMSFELD: JUDICIOUS
BALANCING AT THE INTERSECTION OF
THE EXECUTIVE'S POWER TO DETAIN
AND THE CITIZEN-DETAINEE'S RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
I. INTRODUCTION

In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,1 the United States Supreme Court held that a
citizen detained by the Government as an enemy combatant is entitled
under due process to a meaningful opportunity to contest the facts
underlying his detention before a neutral decision-maker. 2 The Supreme
Court examined whether the Executive possessed the power to indefinitely
detain United States citizens captured abroad in the midst of the War on
Terror and labeled "enemy combatants" without a hearing.3 In finding that
such a citizen-detainee was entitled to some form of impartial hearing
pursuant to the Due Process Clause, the Court vacated and remanded the
Fourth Circuit's decision allowing detention based on an extremely limited
showing of evidence. 4
This Note examines the four opinions in Hami and concludes that
while the outcome of the case was correct, the plurality opinion authored by
Justice O'Connor was inadequate, because the outlook for citizens detained
in conjunction with the War on Terror in the future remains extremely
murky and ambiguous. The Court failed to address several difficult issues
raised by its holding. First, the Court declined to precisely define the term
"enemy combatant." While the plurality opinion successfully established
that the President was authorized to detain a citizen if it was sufficiently
clear that he was in fact an enemy combatant, the opinion failed to precisely
define the term. Second, the plurality opinion erroneously employed the
1 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (plurality opinion).
2 Id. at 2635 (plurality opinion).
3 Id. at 2637-38 (plurality opinion).
4 Id. (plurality opinion).
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Mathews balancing test to weigh the citizen's right to a due process hearing
against the Government's interest in prosecuting a war unfettered by
extraneous litigation.5 This approach failed to recognize that a citizen's
baseline right to a hearing may not be balanced away. Third, the Court
declined to establish a clear set of procedures that must be followed prior to
and during the hearing before the neutral decision-maker. Finally, it
remains unclear whether a military tribunal will suffice for the required
neutral decision-maker, a possibility that the plurality opinion mentioned
but did not discuss. 6 Alternatively, the concept of a new federal terrorism
court with built-in intelligence protections emerges as the better option for
the role of the neutral decision-maker.
II. BACKGROUND
A. WARTIME DETENTION AND MILITARY TRIBUNALS PRIOR TO
HAMDI-FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II

In the Civil War case Ex parte Milligan, a United States citizen was
detained in a military prison and put on trial before a military tribunal on
charges that he aided a Confederate military organization and conspired to
obtain weapons and free Confederate prisoners. 7 Milligan was sentenced to
death by the military tribunal for violating the laws of war.8 He then filed a
habeas corpus petition, alleging that the military tribunal was without
jurisdiction to try him. 9 The Court, in establishing the open courts rule,
held that Congress did not have the power to create military tribunals when
state courts were open and available. 10 Thus, Milligan had been denied his
right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 1
The Court reached a very different result when it next addressed
wartime detention and the use of military tribunals more than seventy-five
years later during World War II in Ex parte Quirin.12 In Quirin, eight Nazi
saboteurs, one of whom, Hans Haupt, was a United States citizen, were
detained after they were captured in 1942 by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation upon entering the United States from Germany with

5 Id. at 2646 (plurality opinion) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).

6 Id. at 2651 (plurality opinion).

71 U.S. (1 Wall.) 2, 6-7 (1866).
8 Id.at 7.

9Id.
10 Id.at 121-22.
" Id.at 122.

12317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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explosives and orders to sabotage United States military facilities.' 3 The
eight were tried before a military commission, which had been appointed by
the President roughly three weeks after the Nazi saboteurs had been
captured.14 The Nazis, including Haupt, attempted to stop the trial before
the military commission by filing habeas corpus petitions in federal district
court.'5 They contended that because the federal courts were open and
functioning normally, the President may not deny them the due
process of a
16
jury trial by ordering that they be tried by a military tribunal.
The Supreme Court unanimously ruled against the detainees, finding
that the President was constitutionally and statutorily authorized to subject
the eight men to a trial before a military commission rather than a domestic
federal court. 17 The Court stressed the distinction between lawful and
unlawful combatants: "Lawful combatants are subject to capture and
detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful
combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition
they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which
render their belligerency unlawful."' 18 For example, unlawful combatants
include the spy and the "enemy combatant," who wages war without a
uniform contrary to the laws of war.1 9 Furthermore, the fact that the enemy
combatant was a United States citizen, as in Haupt's case, does not excuse
him from punishment at the hands of a military tribunal.20
While not explicitly overruling Ex parte Milligan, the Quirin Court
declined to follow the open courts rule.2 1 The Court found that the rule was
inapplicable to the Quirin case because Milligan was not an enemy
belligerent since he was not "a part of or associated with the armed forces
of the enemy," whereas Haupt was an unlawful combatant, subject to
penalties imposed by a military tribunal.22
The Ninth Circuit addressed the habeas corpus petition of a United
States citizen captured on the battlefield in Sicily and detained as a prisoner

'3

Id. at 20-22.

14Id. at 22-23.
'"

Id. at 23-24.

16Id.

Id. at 25-30.
IId. at 31.

'7

19 Id.
20 Id. at

37. "Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy

government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts
are enemy belligerents within the meaning of... the law of war." Id.at 37-38.
21 Id.at 45-46.
22 Id.at 45.
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of war during World War II in In re Territo.23 Gaetano Territo was a
United States citizen by birth who moved to Italy at the age of five.24 In
1943, he served with the Italian Army while Italy and the United States
were at war.25 Territo was captured by United States forces and detained as
a prisoner of war in the United States.26 In his habeas action, Territo
27
claimed that his detention was illegal because he was an American citizen.
The district court concluded that neither Territo's United States citizenship
nor his contention that he was a non-combat member of the Italian army
diminished the legality of his detention by the United States military as a
prisoner of war. 2 8 In affirming the district court's dismissal of the habeas
petition, the Ninth Circuit broadly construed the term "prisoner of war" and
found that "all persons who are active in opposing an army in war may be
captured and except for spies and other non-uniformed plotters and actors
for the enemy are prisoners of war." 29 The court stated that the ultimate
goal of capture and detention of enemies in wartime is "to prevent the
captured individual from serving the enemy." 30
B. STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION FOR THE DETENTION OF UNITED
STATES CITIZENS IN WARTIME
1. The Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)
18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) provides that "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or
otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of
Congress.",31 The legislative history of this statute 32 reveals that its purpose
was to repeal the Emergency Detention Act of 1950, 33 which "established
procedures for the apprehension and detention, during internal security
emergencies, of individuals deemed likely to engage in espionage or
sabotage., 34 In 1971, Congress was concerned that the Emergency
Detention Act would allow a recurrence of the round up and internment of

27

156 F.2d 142 (1946).
Id. at 143.
Id
Id.
Id. at 142.

23

24
25
26
21

Id. at 144.

29

Id. at 145.

30

Id.

31 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000).
1 H.R. Rep. No. 92-116, at 2 (1971), reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1435, 1435.
3' 50 U.S.C. § 811, repealedby Pub. L. No. 92-128, § 2(a), 85 Stat. 348 (1971).
14

H.R. Rep. No. 92-116, at2.
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American
citizens of Japanese ancestry that occurred during World War
5
3

11.

2. Authorizationfor Use of MilitaryForce
One week after the attacks of September 11, 2001 by the al Qaeda
terrorist network, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military
Force ("AUMF").36 The AUMF authorized the President
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks... or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future
acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations
37
or persons.

C. THE CITIZEN'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

1. The Due ProcessClause
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: "No person
shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law ....
,38 The Clause originated in the English Magna Carta and, at its
core, was "intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of
the powers of Government, unrestrained by the established principles of
private right and distributive justice. 39 Simply stated, the Due Process
Clause "gives all Americans, whoever they are and wherever they happen to
be, the right to be tried by independent and unprejudiced40 courts using
established procedures and applying valid pre-existing laws.
2. The Mathews Balancing Test
The Supreme Court established a new analytical framework for
recognizing an individual's constitutionally guaranteed right to procedural
due process in Mathews v. Eldridge.4' In Mathews, the plaintiffs social
security disability benefits were terminated by the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare without a pre-termination hearing.42 The plaintiff
35Id.; see Korematsu v. United States, 324 U.S. 885 (1945).
36 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
37Id. at 224.
38 U.S. CONST. amend. V.

39Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819).
40 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169 (1968).
4' 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
42 Id. at 324.
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sued the agency, alleging that the Due Process Clause required an
evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of benefits.4 3 The Court quoted
the "truism" that "due process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands." 44 The Court then set forth
three factors that must be balanced in order to determine the level of
process due in any given case:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest throuah
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safe uards: and finally. the Government's
interest, includina the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.45
In striking the appropriate due process balance, the Court found that
the individual was not due a pre-termination evidentiary hearing because
the administrative burdens on the Government would outweigh the
countervailing benefits to the individual.4 6
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In late 2001, Yaser Esam Hamdi, an American citizen by birth, was
seized by Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan.4 7 Hamdi was later
turned over to the United States military, which interrogated him before
transferring him to the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
then to Norfolk, Virginia, and finally to a naval brig in Charleston, South
Carolina.48
Based on the initial interrogation of Hamdi and the
circumstances of his capture, the military concluded that Hamdi was an
enemy combatant.49 With respect to those individuals captured during
hostilities in Afghanistan, the term "enemy combatant" was defined as an
individual who "was part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States
or coalition partners, and engaged in an armed conflict against the United
States."5 °

41 Id. at 325.

44 Id. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
45 Id. at 335.
46 Id. at

348-49.

47 Brief for Respondents at 4, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
48 Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, Hamdi (No. 03-6696).
49 Brief for Respondents at 4, Hamdi (No. 03-6696).
50 Dep't of Defense, Fact Sheet: Guantanamo Detainees (2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2004/d20040220det.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2005).
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On June 11, 2002, Hamdi's father filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 with the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia. 5' The petition alleged that the Government had
detained Hamdi without charging him with any crime and without allowing
him access to legal counsel, thus violating his rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 2 The district court ordered that a federal
public
53
defender be assigned and given unmonitored access to Hamdi.
The Government appealed the order, and on July 12, 2002, the Fourth
Circuit reversed.5 4 The Fourth Circuit found that the district court had not
afforded the Government the appropriate amount of deference to its
intelligence gathering or national security concerns in a time of ongoing
military hostilities abroad.55 The appellate court remanded the case and
instructed the district court to "consider the most cautious procedures first"
in conducting a deferential inquiry into Hamdi's enemy combatant status.5 6
On remand, the Government filed a motion to dismiss Hamdi's habeas
petition on July 25, 2002, attaching the two-page sworn declaration of
Michael Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy ("Mobbs Declaration"). 7 Mobbs indicated his close involvement
with the detention of enemy combatants fighting with the al Qaeda terrorists
and his familiarity with the facts of Hamdi's capture and detention.5 8
Mobbs alleged that Hamdi traveled to Afghanistan in July or August 2001,
affiliated with a Taliban military unit where he received weapons training,
and remained with his Taliban unit until his unit surrendered to the
Northern Alliance in late 2001 .59 According to Mobbs, a United States
interrogation team interviewed Hamdi, who identified himself as a Saudi
citizen born in the United States and admitted to entering Afghanistan to
train and fight with the Taliban.60 Thus, based on his association with the
Taliban and the fact that he had a firearm in his possession at the time of his
51Brief for Petitioner at 7, Hamdi (No. 03-6696).
52

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5-6, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, (E.D. Va. June 11,

2002) (No. 2:02cv439).
53Order, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, (E.D. Va. Jun. 11, 2002) (No. 2:02cv439), available at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/2:02-cv-00439/docs/69794/0.pdf.
54Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 2002).
" Id.at 282.
56 Id.at 284.
57 Respondents' Response to, and Motion to Dismiss, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus at Exhibit 1, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, (E.D. Va. Jul. 25, 2002) (No. 2:02cv439), available
at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/2:02-cv-00439/docs/69820/0.pdf.
58 Id.
59 id.
60 id.
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capture, the United States military considered Hamdi an enemy
combatant. 6
Upon examining the Mobbs Declaration, the district court found that it
fell "far short," standing alone, of justifying Hamdi's detention because it
raised "more questions than it answer[ed]" and was "little more than the
Government's 'say-so' regarding the validity of Hamdi's classification as
an enemy combatant., 62 The court ordered the Government to produce, for
in camera review, copies of Hamdi's statements, notes taken during
Hamdi's interviews, the identities of Hamdi's interrogators, and other
information regarding Hamdi's capture, detention, and enemy-combatant
label.63 The court found that even though the Executive was entitled to
deference regarding military designations of individuals, the courts had a
role in reviewing those designations when they infringed on the freedom of
American citizens.64
The Government appealed the district court's production order and, in
January 2003, the Fourth Circuit reversed, remanding the case with
directions to dismiss Hamdi's petition for writ of habeas corpus. 65 Finding
that it was "undisputed that Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat
in a foreign theater of conflict," the court held that the Mobbs Declaration
was sufficient to constitutionally support Hamdi's detention in light of the
Executive's war powers, and further factual inquiry was unnecessary or
improper. 6666 Pursuant to the separation of powers principle, the judicial
branch does have a duty to protect individual liberties in peacetime and
wartime, and "[t]he detention of United States citizens must be subject to
judicial review. ' ' 6 7 But the court proceeded to note two "vital purposes"
served by the detention of uncharged enemy combatants: (1) it prevents the
individual from rejoining the enemy and continuing to fight, and (2) it "may
relieve the burden on military commanders of litigating the circumstances
of a capture halfway around the globe., 68 The Fourth Circuit determined
that the "deferential posture" with which the judicial branch must engage
actions taken by the executive branch in wartime results in the need, here,
to take the Mobbs Declaration at face value, rather than delve into the
61
62
63

Id.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 533-35 (E.D. Va. 2002).
Id. at 528; see also Order, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, (E.D. Va. Jul. 31, 2002) (No.

2:02cv439), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/2:02-cv-00439/docs/69829/
0.pdf.
' Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
6' Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 464.
68 Id. at 465.
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individual facts and circumstances of Hamdi's capture, detention, and
status.69
Hamdi also argued that the Government lacked the legal authorization
to detain citizen enemy combatants, and thus, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
4001(a) and Article 5 of the Geneva Convention, such detentions were
unlawful.70 With regard to 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), the Fourth Circuit rejected
Hamdi's contention because the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF) satisfied 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)'s requirement that "[n]o citizen shall
be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to
an Act of Congress.'
In short, "the 'necessary and appropriate force'
referenced in the [AUMF] necessarily includes the capture and detention of
any and all hostile forces arrayed against [U.S.] troops. 72 As to Article 5
of the Geneva Convention, which requires a "competent tribunal" to
formally determine whether an individual is an enemy combatant, the
Fourth Circuit ruled that the provision is not "self-executing," and even if it
were, 3there were serious questions as to whether it would apply to Hamdi's
7
case.

The Fourth Circuit denied a rehearing en banc by a vote of eight-totwo. 74 Hamdi then filed a petition for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court, which was granted.75 Some time after the grant of
certiorari, Hamdi was allowed to meet for consultations 76 with courtappointed counsel several times, including unmonitored visits.
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S PLURALITY OPINION
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Fourth Circuit's
decision, holding that Hamdi was entitled to contest his status as an enemy
combatant before a neutral decision-maker.7 7 Writing for the plurality,
Justice O'Connor 78 concluded that, while Congress had authorized the
69 Id. at 474.
70

Id.at 467.

71Id.
72

Id

71Id.at 468-69.
74Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003).
75Hamdi v. Rurnsfeld, 540 U.S. 1099 (2004).

76 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2652 (2004) (plurality opinion).
77 Id.at 2635 (plurality opinion).
78Justice O'Connor's plurality was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy and Breyer.
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detention of enemy combatants, due process demanded that Hamdi be given
a meaningful opportunity to challenge the facts of his capture and enemycombatant label, by virtue of his United States citizenship.79
The Court first examined the question of whether the detention of a
United States citizen who fits the definition of "enemy combatant" was
authorized. 80 Since Hamdi was detained pursuant to the AUMF, the
requirement that an individual is being detained pursuant to "an Act of
Congress," per 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), is satisfied. 8' Thus, the AUMF was
"explicit authorization" for the President to detain enemy combatants
because such detention for the duration of the particular conflict was a
fundamental and accepted incident to war in keeping with the necessary and
appropriate force Congress had authorized the President to use.82 Hamdi
also argued that the AUMF did not authorize the indefinite detention he
faced. 83 While agreeing with Hamdi's argument that his detention may not
continue after active hostilities have ended, and with Hamdi's assertion that
his detention could last for the duration of his lifetime due to the character
of the War on Terror, the Court relied on the fact that, at the time of the
opinion, active combat operations in Afghanistan were ongoing.84 The
plurality opinion declared that its holding that the AUMF authorized
detention of an enemy combatant only applied "once
it is sufficiently clear
85
that the individual is, in fact, an enemy combatant.
Next, the Court analyzed the level of constitutional due process owed
to a United States citizen, like Hamdi, who challenges the Government's
determination that he is an enemy combatant. 86 The Government argued
that the production of the Mobbs Declaration to the court deciding Hamdi's
habeas petition completed its required factual basis supporting detention.87
Specifically, the Government asserted that the judicial branch's review of
its labeling a citizen as an enemy combatant should not extend beyond the
deferential "some evidence" standard.88 On the other hand, Hamdi argued
79 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635 (plurality opinion).
80 Id. at 2639 (plurality opinion).
81 Id. at 2639-40 (plurality opinion).
82 Id. (plurality opinion).
83 Id. at 2641 (plurality opinion).
84 Id. at 2641-42 (plurality opinion).
85 Id. at 2643 (plurality opinion).
86 Id. (plurality opinion).
87 Id. at 2644 (plurality opinion).
88 Id. at 2645 (plurality opinion) (citing Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v.
Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-57 (1985)) (finding that the "some evidence" standard "does not
require" a "weighing of the evidence," but instead calls for determining "whether there is
any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion").
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that due process mandated that he be afforded the opportunity to challenge
the Mobbs Declaration with counter evidence at a hearing before a neutral
tribunal. 89 The Court employed a balancing test, first established in
Mathews v. Eldridge,9" to weigh these competing interests. 91 Hamdi's
private interest consisted of his interest in freedom from erroneous
detention by the Government, while the Government's interests included
both the goal of preventing the enemy combatant from rejoining the enemy
and the freedom from the distraction of litigating military actions halfway
around the globe.92 In "[s]triking the proper constitutional balance," the
Court held that citizen-detainees such as Hamdi must receive "notice of the
factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to 93rebut the
Government's factual assertions before a neutral decision-maker."
Since Hamdi had not had any meaningful chance to challenge his
alleged status as an enemy combatant, the Court concluded that he had
essentially received no process.94 Per the Court, the military interrogation
of a detainee, "however effective as an intelligence-gathering tool, hardly
constitutes a constitutionally adequate factfinding before a neutral
decisionmaker. ''95 The Court went on to offer three additional contours to
the type of proceeding it expected in light of both the demands of the
Constitution and the special circumstances of a case such as Hamdi's.9 6 For
example, hearsay offered by the Government may be acceptable as the most
reliable available evidence.9 7 Also, a rebuttable presumption in favor of the
Government's evidence may be tolerable. 98 Lastly, an "appropriately
authorized and properly constituted military tribunal" could possibly
conduct such a hearing. 99
Finally, the Court discussed the Government's contention that
separation of powers principles drastically limited the role of the judicial
89 Id. at 2645-46 (plurality opinion).
90 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

9' Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2646 (plurality opinion). According to the Mathews test, "the
process due in any given instance is determined by weighing 'the private interest that will be
affected by the official action' against the Government's asserted interest 'including the
function involved' and the burdens the Government would face in providing greater
process." Id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
92 Id. at 2647-48 (plurality opinion).
93 Id. at 2648 (plurality opinion).
94 Id. at 2651 (plurality opinion).
9' Id. (plurality opinion).
96 Id. at 2649 (plurality opinion).
97 Id. (plurality opinion).
98Id. (plurality opinion).
99 Id. at 2651 (plurality opinion).
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branch in a case implicating the President's war powers. 100 In rejecting this
claim, the Court relied on precedent stating that wartime does not mean that
the President possesses a "blank check" in dealing with citizens' rights.' l
While the war power is a "power to wage war successfully...
constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties" must remain in
place during wartime.10 2 In short, "it would turn our system of checks and
balances on its head to suggest that a citizen could not make his way to
court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention by his
Government simply because the Executive opposes making available such a
challenge."' 1 3 Thus, the Court rejected the "some evidence" standard set
forth by the Government because it would deprive the alleged enemy
combatant the chance to refute the Government's
charges, thereby vesting a
04
great deal of power in the executive branch.
B. JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRING OPINION
In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter 10 5 disagreed with the plurality's
finding that the detention of a citizen designated as an enemy combatant
was legally authorized. 0 6 Justice Souter maintained that 18 U.S.C. §
4001 (a), requiring that detention by the executive branch must be "pursuant
to an Act of Congress," must be read broadly to require explicit
authorization, based on legislative intent and the circumstances under which
Section 4001(a) was adopted. 10 7 The purpose of the AUMF was to
authorize the use of armies and weapons, and does not even contain the
word "detention."' 1 8 The statute cannot fairly be read to authorize the
detention of United States citizens, and, therefore, the stringent requirement
of Section 4001 (a) was not satisfied.10 9
Justice Souter also pointed out that under the Geneva Convention
individuals seized on the battlefield in Afghanistan appear to qualify for

100 Id. at 2650 (plurality opinion).
101Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.

579, 587 (1952)).
102 Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Home Building & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 426 (1934)).
103 Id. (plurality opinion).
104 Id. at 2651 (plurality opinion).
105 Justice Souter's concurrence was joined by Justice Ginsburg; Justice Souter concurred
in part, dissented in part, and concurred in the judgment.
106 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2653 (Souter, J., concurring).
I07d. at 2653-55 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000)).
100Id. at 2657 (Souter, J., concurring).
109Id. at 2659 (Souter, J., concurring).
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prisoner-of-war treatment.11 ° However, Hamdi had not been treated as
such, since he has been held incommunicado."' Furthermore, the United
States military's own regulations, implementing the Geneva Convention
with regard to captured individuals,112provide for a military tribunal in order
to determine an individual's status.
C. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENTING OPINION
Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia concluded that the Government
possessed only two options when seeking to detain a United States citizen:
(1) it could charge the citizen-detainee with a crime or (2) Congress could
suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 113 Justice Scalia began by pointing out
that at the "very core of liberty" is the "freedom from indefinite
imprisonment at the will of the Executive." ' 1 4 The Constitution recognizes
due process as "the right secured," and habeas corpus as the "instrument by
which due process [may] be insisted upon by a citizen illegally
imprisoned ....
'5 While conceding that the allegations against Hamdi
were not ordinary criminal accusations, the issue in Hamdi's detention
remained whether "there is a different, special procedure for imprisonment
of a citizen accused of wrongdoing by aiding the enemy in wartime."1 16 An
examination of the Constitution and of history led Justice Scalia to
determine that there
was no third way beyond the Government's two
17
existing options."
Justice Scalia argued that treason was understood by the Framers of
the Constitution as subject to criminal punishment." 8 According to Justice
Scalia, the criminal process was the exclusive means, absent Congressional
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, "not only to punish traitors, but to
incapacitate them" because of the Framers' "general mistrust of military
power permanently at the Executive's disposal." ' 19 He pointed out the fact
that John Phillip Walker Lindh, the only other United States citizen, besides
1 Id. at 2658 (Souter, J., concurring).
I (Souter, J., concurring).
Id.
112 Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Army Reg. 190-8 §§ 1-5, 1-6 (1997)).
13 Id. at 2660 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114 Id. at 2661 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115 id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 2663 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 2671 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 2663 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 ("Treason against
the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their
Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on
the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.").
19 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2668 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Hamdi, to be captured in Afghanistan and accused of fighting alongside
al
12
Qaeda against the United States, was subjected to the criminal process. 0
Next, Justice Scalia indicated that the Constitution's Suspension
Clause strictly limits the situations under which the writ of habeas corpus
may be suspended by Congress. 21 In Ex parte Milligan, the Court rejected
the Government's attempt to assert military jurisdiction when the courts
were open. 122 Justice Scalia proceeded to apply the "open courts rule,"
notwithstanding the Court's language in Ex parte Quirin,12 3 to Hamdi's
detention, finding it "not less unlawful than Milligan's trial by military
tribunal.' 24 He concluded his opinion by dismissing Justice O'Connor's
Mathews analysis, because its "judicious balancing" wrongly increased the
power of the Court, and rejecting her three "unheard-of' proposals for
''
satisfying due process, deriding them as "constitutional improvisation. 25
D. JUSTICE THOMAS'S DISSENTING OPINION
The dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas focused on separation of
powers arguments to assert that Hamdi's detention fell "squarely" within
the constitutional war powers of the federal Government, and the Court
lacked the "expertise and capacity to second-guess that decision.', 126 Justice
Thomas explained that "no governmental interest is more compelling than
the security of the Nation," and that the Founders vested in the President the
responsibility and the power to protect the national security.'2 7 The
President, as Commander in Chief of the military, often receives and acts
upon intelligence that is properly held secret, and, thus, the Courts cannot,
and should not, compel the information or second-guess the President's
actions regarding national security.

28

While the legality of Hamdi's

120 Id.at 2664 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541
(E.D. Va. 2002) (Lindh was convicted upon a guilty plea).
121 Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at 2665 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
2) ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
122 Id. at 2667 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (1 Wall.) 2, 121
(1866)).
123 Justice Scalia distinguished the facts of Hamdi from Quirin by pointing out that in
Quirin, "it was uncontested that the petitioners were members of enemy forces." Id.at 2670
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
124 Id.at 2668 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125 Id.at 2672 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126 Id.at 2674 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
127 Id.at 2675 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
128 Id.at 2676 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).
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detention is a matter for the Court to decide, the legality hinges on whether
Hamdi is actually an enemy combatant, and the answer to that question is
properly in the executive branch's province and properly withheld from the
Court's review. 129 With regard to Hamdi's Fifth Amendment claim, "due
process of law depends on the circumstances," and, in Hamdi's case,
"requires nothing more than a good-faith executive determination" of his
enemy combatant status, since the President is acting within the war power
and Congressional authorization. 30 Finally, Justice Thomas disagreed with
Justice O'Connor's use of the Mathews balancing test and stated that even
if it was proper, it was misapplied because the
Government's interest in
3
protecting the nation was grossly undervalued.1 '
V. ANALYSIS

The Court in Hamdi failed to decide several important issues that bear
directly upon how lower courts will decide the fates of citizen-detainees in
the future. While the Court correctly reasoned that the President was
authorized to detain United States citizens captured abroad in conjunction
with the War on Terror, that authorization and authority is premised upon
sufficient proof that the citizen was indeed an enemy combatant. Yet, the
Court refused to precisely define what acts shall constitute actions of an
enemy combatant in the future. The plurality was wrong to rely on the
Mathews balancing test, because the test was conceived to deal with due
process hearings regarding property interests in the field of administrative
law and was not designed nor intended to possess the capability to deny
citizens' liberty interests without a hearing. Rather, the citizen naturally
possesses a baseline right to a hearing regarding the facts underlying his
status when facing indefinite confinement. Furthermore, the alterations to
the normal due process protections provided a citizen facing imprisonment
were, while not extreme, questionable in light of the need for a
fundamentally fair and meaningful hearing and utterly unsupported by
precedent or reasoning in the opinion. Finally, the Court failed to address
the precise nature of the neutral decision-maker that will preside over future
hearings whose goal is to determine whether a citizen is an enemy
combatant. While Justice O'Connor mentioned the possibility of using
military tribunals, a new federal terrorism court may better guarantee
fairness to the citizen while ensuring the protection of sensitive intelligence
and security.

129

Id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

130 Id. at 2680-81 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
131Id. at 2683-84 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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A. WARTIME DETENTION BY THE EXECUTIVE OF UNITED STATES
CITIZENS CAPTURED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AS ENEMY
COMBATANTS WAS AUTHORIZED

1. The A UME Authorized the Presidentto Detain Enemy Combatants
Capturedin Afghanistan
Before examining the issue of how best to determine whether a United
States citizen is indeed an enemy combatant, the threshold question is
whether the President possessed the authority to detain such citizen-enemy
combatants.
Hamdi's detention put into conflict two perennial
constitutional principles: the President's war powers pursuant to Article II
and the citizen's right to due process prior to the loss of liberty pursuant to
the Fifth Amendment.132 The first step in the analysis must be to determine
whether the President was authorized to detain anyone, citizen or noncitizen, in conjunction with the military campaign in Afghanistan. The
Court's plurality opinion declined to address whether, as the Government
argued, the President has plenary authority to detain whomever he deems
necessary pursuant to Article 11.133

Justice Thomas agreed with the

Government's view, arguing that "the President has constitutional authority
to protect the national security and... this authority carries with it broad
discretion," but he was alone in this view. 134 In examining the President's
authority when acting with or without Congress, Justice Thomas alluded to
the test set forth by Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.135 The plurality opinion and
Justice Thomas's dissent both correctly argued that the AUMF constituted
Congress' implied authorization for the President to detain those individuals
fighting for or with the Taliban. Justice O'Connor asserted that the AUMF
language authorizing the President to use "all necessary and appropriate
force" against those associated with the attacks of September 11, 2001,
must be read to imply the power to detain those people captured in the
course of fighting against members of the Taliban, as a fundamental
132

Id. at 2646 (plurality opinion).

133 Id. at 2639 (plurality opinion).

Id. at 2675 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
343 U.S. 579, 636-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Youngstown involved the
President's authority under his "emergency power" to seize private steel companies facing a
labor strike during the Korean War. Id. at 582-83. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Jackson set forth a test which recognized three broad categories of Presidential action in light
of action or inaction by Congress. The President's power is at its maximum when he acts in
conjunction with Congressional authority; his power is at its weakest when he acts contrary
to will of Congress; and his power is in a "zone of twilight" when he acts in the absence of
Congressional action. Id. at 636-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
134
135
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incident to war. 136 In Justice Jackson's framework from Youngstown, the
President acted with implied congressional approval to detain opposition
fighters in37 Afghanistan, and, therefore, he was acting with maximum
1

authority.

2. The Presidentwas Authorized to Detain United States Citizens as Enemy
Combatants because the A UMF Satisfied the Requirements of 18 U.S.C. §
4001(a)
Having established that the President was authorized to detain
individuals fighting against the United States military in Afghanistan, the
next necessary step of the analysis is to determine whether the President's
power included the authority to detain enemy combatants who also
happened to be United States citizens. The provision contained in 18
U.S.C. § 4001(a) that "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress" was
the substance of Justice Souter's opinion.138 Justice Souter argued that
since the Non-Detention Statute must be read broadly due to legislative
intent and since the AUMF did not even mention the word "detention," the
AUMF cannot be read to have satisfied the requirements of 18 U.S.C.139§
4001(a) with regard to the detention of citizen-enemy combatants.
However, the plurality opinion set forth the better view, that, in light of the
President's constitutionally-based war powers of Article II, 18 U.S.C. §
4001(a) was indeed satisfied by the AUMF, which served as the necessary
"Act of Congress."
3. The Court has Previously Held that Individualsmay be Detainedas
Enemy CombatantsDespite Their UnitedStates Citizenship
The proposition that even United States citizens may be detained in
wartime when the citizen is actively fighting for or with the enemy is also
supported by precedent. The case In re Territo presented facts nearly
identical to Hamdi.140 The Ninth Circuit found that whether Territo was or
was not a United States citizen was "immaterial" to the legality of the
detention as a prisoner of war because all persons, regardless of their
136 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640 (plurality opinion).

"' See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (asserting that "[w]hen the
President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at
its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can
delegate").
' Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2653 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"9 Id. at 2653 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141 In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 142-43 (1946).
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citizenship, who oppose an army during a war and are captured by that
army, may be detained as prisoners of war. 141 The plurality opinion in
Hamdi used the Territo case to support the Court's holding and to rebut
Justice Scalia's claim that, when dealing with a United States citizen, the
Government's only options are to suspend the writ of habeas corpus or to
charge the citizen with a crime and prosecute him under the criminal justice
system. 142 Similarly, in Exparte Quirin, the Court found that Haupt, one of
the Nazi saboteurs captured as he attempted to invade the United States,
who happened to be an American citizen, was nonetheless "subject to trial
and punishment by [a] military tribunal[]" for his actions, despite his United
States citizenship. 143 Thus, based on precedent, it is clear that citizens and
non-citizens alike may be held by the Government if they are enemy
combatants.
4. The PreciseDefinition of the Term "Enemy Combatant" Bears Directly
on the President'sAuthority to Detain
While the President was authorized by Congress through the AUMF to
detain enemy combatants, including enemy combatants who are also United
States citizens, one issue that remains is the definition of the term "enemy
combatant." The plurality in Hamdi held that his detention was authorized
only if it was "sufficiently clear" that he was an enemy combatant. 144 Thus,
a clear definition of what conduct warrants an enemy combatant label is
necessary in order to determine whether the President was authorized to
detain individuals so labeled. In Hamdi, the Government argued that an
enemy combatant is an individual captured in Afghanistan who "was part of
or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners, and
[who] engaged in an armed conflict against the United States."' 145 The
Fourth Circuit defined the term much more broadly as "persons captured
during wartime. ' 146 Subsequent to the Hamdi decision, the Department of
Defense defined "enemy combatant" as an "individual who was part of or
supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged
in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This

141

Id. at 144-45.

142 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2643 (plurality opinion).
143

Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31, 37-38 (1942).

'44Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2643 (plurality opinion).
145Brief for Respondents at 3, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696)

(quoting Dep't of Defense, Fact Sheet: Guantanamo Detainees, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2004/d20040220det.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2005)).
146 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 463 n.3 (2003).
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includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly
supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces. 147
According to a report by the American Bar Association Task Force on
Treatment of Enemy Combatants, the term "enemy combatant" is not a term
of art possessing a long-established meaning. 148 The term "enemy
combatant" appears to have originated in Ex Parte Quirin. 49 The Court in
Quirin differentiated between lawful and unlawful combatants and provided
as an example of an unlawful combatant "an enemy combatant who without
uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by
destruction of life or property. . ,150 The practical importance of the
distinction is that lawful combatants that are captured and detained are
prisoners of war. 51 Prisoners of war are subject to the Geneva Convention,
which provides that they are not to be prosecuted or punished for the
military acts they committed during war. 5 2 On the other hand, unlawful
combatants captured and detained may be put on trial and punished before
military tribunals for the acts that made their combat unlawful.'53
Assuming that the term "enemy combatant" is synonymous with the
term "unlawful combatant," it appears as though the line between lawful
combatants and enemy combatants cannot always be easily drawn. The
Court's opinion in Quirin suggests that the largest factor in the labeling of
the Nazi saboteurs as "enemy combatants" was the fact that they entered the
territory of the United States in secret, without wearing uniforms. 154 In
Hamdi's case, the Government and the plurality opinion used the term
"enemy combatant" to include all those who fight for or with terrorist

organizations against United States military forces, rather than within a
regular military structure of a recognized country. 155 The plurality opinion
147 Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, regarding the Department of Defense
Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal, July 7, 2004, (on file with the author
and,
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d2OO4O7O7review.pdf)
[hereinafter Department of Defense Order]. This order states that it only applies to foreign

nationals held as enemy combatants at Guantanamo, but it sheds light on the definition of the
term. Id.
148Neal R. Sonett et al., American Bar Association Task Force on Treatment of Enemy
Combatants: Preliminary Report, 7 (Aug. 8, 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/
leadership/enemycombatants.pdf.
149 Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942).
150 Id.
151 Id.
152

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 2, 82 (Aug.12,

1949), availableat http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91 .htm.
153 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31.
154 Id.

'5'Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2639 (2004) (plurality opinion).

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[Vol. 95

failed to further define the term "enemy combatant" beyond the
Government's definition of the term provided in its brief, which appears to
be specific to the war against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. 156 The Supreme
Court effectively left it up to the lower federal courts to define the contours
of the enemy combatant label. Congress should engage in the discussion of
how precisely to define the term "enemy combatant" in the age of the
global war on terrorism in order to further bolster the President's authority
to detain such individuals. Ideally, Congress would precisely define the
term "enemy combatant" based, in part, on input from the executive branch,
and the courts would fulfill their role in applying those established criteria
to each individual case.
Finally, it remains perplexing why the Government pursued such
drastically different courses of action against the two United States citizens
captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan: Yaser Esam Hamdi and John
Phillip Walker Lindh. Lindh was subjected to the United States criminal
justice system, charged with various violations of anti-terrorism laws in
federal district court. 157 Hamdi was held incommunicado without formal
charges. 58 It is likely that the choice between detaining true citizen-enemy
combatants indefinitely or subjecting the individual to the criminal process
is well within the President's war powers umbrella authority. Yet, a
formalized procedure, developed by either the executive branch or
Congress, outlining precisely how future citizen-enemy combatants
captured abroad in the global war on terror will be treated is overdue. Such
a code would give the Government increased legitimacy at this difficult
intersection between the President's wartime power and the individual's
due process right.

156

Id.

157 United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 547 (2002). The allegations against
Lindh by the Government were similar to those against Hamdi. Id. at 545-47. The
Government alleged that Lindh traveled from the United States to Pakistan where he
attended a military training camp and later fought with al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Id. at 54546. Lindh was captured by the Northern Alliance in November 2001 and was later
transported back to the United States where he faced a ten count criminal indictment in
federal district court. Id. at 546-47.
...Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2636 (plurality opinion).
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B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S USE OF THE MATHEWS BALANCING TEST
WAS IMPROPER
1. Chartingan Intermediate Road between the District Court and the
Fourth Circuit
Hamdi implicates two central constitutional principles which are in
direct conflict on the facts of this case: the Executive's war power derived
from Article II and the citizen's right to procedural due process prior to the
loss of liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. 159 Justice O'Connor
described the dilemma as "the tension that often exists between the
autonomy that the Government asserts is necessary in order to pursue
effectively a particular goal and the process that a citizen contends he is due
before he is deprived of a constitutional right.' 160 Justice O'Connor
161
resorted to a judicious balancing test established in Mathews v. Eldridge.
Under the Mathews test, the "private interest that will be affected by the
official action" is weighed against the Government's interest "including the
function involved" plus the Government's increased burden if it were to
provide the additional process to the individual.1 62 Thus, in Hamdi's case,
his private interest was his liberty interest in not being erroneously detained
by the Government while the Government's interest included successfully
prosecuting a war on terrorism through detaining enemy63 combatants
without the distraction of litigation halfway around the globe.'
The balancing analysis led Justice O'Connor to chart a middle course
between the district court's pro-Hamdi decision and the Fourth Circuit's
pro-government decision. 164 The district court essentially called for an
extensive production of documents and records by the Government and a
due process hearing on par with a normal habeas corpus proceeding, a
ruling that the Fourth Circuit struck down as not appropriate in light of
deference owed to the Government's national security and intelligence
imperatives. 65 The Fourth Circuit found that the military interrogation had
been sufficient process for Hamdi, and he was due no further review or a
hearing. 166 Justice O'Connor split the difference by finding that the district
court's view did not defer to the Government's interests enough, while the
"9 Id. at 2646 (plurality opinion).
160 Id.(plurality opinion).
161Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
162 Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
163 Id. at 2646-48 (plurality opinion).
Id.at 2648 (plurality opinion).
'64
165 Id. at 2637-38 (plurality opinion).
166 Id.at 2638 (plurality opinion).
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opinion did not afford the citizen-detainee's interest
Fourth Circuit's 167
sufficient weight.
2. The Impropriety of the Mathews Balancing Test
Certainly, the Supreme Court sometimes chooses a unique course not
previously espoused by the parties or the lower courts, but Justice
O'Connor's use of the Mathews balancing test to arrive at such a middle
road was incorrect. Mathews v. Eldridge was a case involving the
termination of disability benefits. 168 In Mathews, the Court balanced the
individual's property right in the continued receipt of disability benefits
against the Government's interest in not incurring the additional cost and
hassle of providing pre-termination hearings to benefit recipients. 169 In
Medina v. California, the Supreme Court reviewed the origins of the
Mathews balancing test and expressed grave doubts about its applicability
to the criminal law arena. 170 The test was conceived to deal with due
process claims arising in the context of administrative law and the property
interests inherent in the provision of Government benefits. 17 1 However, in
subsequent years, the Mathews balancing test has been utilized as a more
general approach for examining due process claims and has been applied in
a variety of factual circumstances. 172 For example, the test was applied by
the Court in a case assessing the nature of the process due a natural parent
in a parental rights termination proceeding.' 73

Similarly, the test was

invoked in a case involving the indefinite commitment of an allegedly
mentally ill individual. 174 Yet, the Mathews test has been used by the Court
in cases involving due process claims in the context of criminal law cases
only twice, and both times, the Court asserts, the test was not clearly
essential to the results reached in either case. 175 In fact, only two years
prior to the Hamdi decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who voted with the
plurality in Hamdi, flatly stated that the Court has "never viewed Mathews
167

Id. at 2648 (plurality opinion).

168 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
169 Id.

170 505 U.S. 437, 444-45 (1992).
171Id. at 444.
172 id.

173Id. (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982)).
174 Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1979)).
175Id.; see Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (utilizing the Mathews test to
decide whether a psychiatrist must be provided to an indigent capital defendant who has
made his sanity an issue prior to trial); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 677 (1980)
(applying the Mathews test to the issue of whether federal magistrates may make findings
and recommendations on motions to suppress evidence).
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76
as announcing an all-embracing test for deciding due process claims."'
Thus, while the Mathews balancing scheme may have merit in the realm of
Government benefits implicating the denial of property rights, the test is
simply inapplicable to a right-to-liberty case such as Hamdi that involves
the essence of two of the most significant constitutional checks and
balances: the war power versus due process.
Moreover, it appears practically impossible to adequately measure
such fundamental and amorphous concepts against one another without
minimizing the importance of one at the expense of the other. Such a
balancing test may be amenable to more finite property rights cases
involving welfare benefits or social security disability benefits. However,
the right to liberty must be recognized as a more transcendent right existing
on a higher plane than property rights and, therefore, incapable of being
balanced by an artificial and abstract test. The likely outcome of such
judicious balancing is that the judicial branch will improperly delegate
additional power to itself under the guise of mechanically weighing
competing interests. As Justice Thomas correctly pointed out, the danger is
that the Court could "balance[] away" either individual rights or
governmental powers guaranteed under the Constitution as the Court sees
fit, thus upsetting the principle of the separation of powers among the three
coequal branches.177
Professors Martin Redish and Lawrence Marshall have taken issue
with the Supreme Court's movement away from notions of due process that
reflect the English common law or modem notions of fairness and toward
the current balancing scheme used to determine how much process is
due. 178 The Supreme Court has drifted away from a recognition of the
general values protected by the Due Process Clause, namely fairness, in
favor of a flexible model applied on a case-by-case basis potentially
inconsistent with the purposes of the Clause and the intent of the
Framers. 79 While a certain degree of flexibility is "both necessary and
advisable," the Court must hold fast to certain core elements of due
process.180 Redish and Marshall argue that "it is likely that the Court's
balancing test, lacking any minimum floor of procedural protection will
generally find in favor of the governmental interest."18' Indeed, "the

Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002).
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2674 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
178 Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the
Values of ProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 468 (1986).
179 Id. at 456.
180 Id.
s' Id. at 473.
176

177
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indeterminacy of the Mathews' balancing test threatens to undermine
wholly the viability of the guarantee [of due process]. '8 2 Chief among
these core elements of due process must be the existence of an independent
adjudicator. 183
To be clear, Justice O'Connor did indeed use the Mathews test to
secure, rather than deny, Hamdi's right to a hearing before a neutral
decision-maker. 184 Yet, it seems entirely plausible that if Justice O'Connor
had simply weighted the competing interests differently, by crediting the
Government's interest more substantially, for example, Hamdi might have
been denied his right to due process altogether. The argument against the
use of the Mathews balancing test, espoused by Redish and Marshall, was
reflected in Justice Scalia's opinion. 185 While some may argue that during
exigencies of war "inter arma silent leges,"'186 Justice Scalia argued that the
Constitution was "designed precisely to confront war" through certain
safeguards and democratic principles, such as the Due Process Clause and
the writ of habeas corpus. 187 Therefore, rather than employing any sort of
balancing test, the Court should instead look to the nature of the interest
implicated in order to determine whether due process should automatically
apply. The more that due process is viewed as an elastic concept
conceivably balanced away by the Court, the greater the risk that the
Justices would be able to impose their own wills over the outcome of a
case, rather than strictly interpreting the Constitution. Applying this
analysis to Hamdi, the Court should have clearly established that the liberty
interest involved was so paramount that meaningful due process should
attach to any effort by the Government to indefinitely incarcerate a United
States citizen. Rather than employing the Mathews test, the better view
would be to recognize the indomitable right of a United States citizen to an
impartial hearing that can never be balanced away by the Government's
interest, as envisioned by the Due Process Clause.
C. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S ALTERATIONS TO NORMAL DUE PROCESS
WERE UNSUPPORTED AND ARBITRARY AND MAY THREATEN
FAIRNESS
Having established, by way of the Mathews balancing test, that Hamdi
was entitled to more process than he received in order to rebut his
182
183

Id.at 474.

184

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004) (plurality opinion).

Id.at 477.

15 Id.at 2672 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
186

"In times of war the laws are silent."

187 Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at 2674 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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classification as an enemy combatant, Justice O'Connor next tumed to the
qualities of the mandated due process hearing. At a minimum, the citizendetainee must receive two things: (1) "notice of the factual basis for his
classification" as an enemy combatant and (2) "a fair opportunity to rebut
188
the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.'
However, Justice O'Connor suggested two significant limits upon the
evidentiary requirements of such a due process hearing.1 89 First, Justice
O'Connor set forth the notion that hearsay "may need to be accepted as the
most reliable available evidence from the Government in such a
proceeding." 190 Second, Justice O'Connor stated that a "presumption in
favor of the Government's evidence, so long as that presumption remained
a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided," would not
offend the Constitution. 91 Specifically, once the Government sets out
"credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant
criteria," the burden could then shift to that petitioner to produce "more
persuasive evidence" that he is not an enemy combatant. 92 Justice
O'Connor argued that under this burden-shifting proposal, the individual's
liberty interest is served because the "errant tourist, embedded journalist, or
local aid worker has a chance to prove military error," while the
Government's asserted interest in prosecuting a war is counterbalanced on
the other side of the equation. 93 Thus, the plurality opinion returns to the
Mathews test, couching its analysis in terms ofjudicious balancing. 9 4
These two arbitrary suggestions are mentioned together in a single,
short paragraph near the end of the opinion and are clearly dicta. 195 The
notions of suspending normal hearsay rules and reversing the normal
burden of proof are completely unsupported by caselaw, statutes, or legal
reasoning in the plurality opinion. But their impact on future citizendetainees seeking to rebut their enemy combatant label may be vast. The
burden shifting scheme is the more drastic and unwise of Justice
O'Connor's two ideas. The conception that the Government must establish
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt remains a pillar of due process in the
criminal justice arena, because it reduces the risk of erroneous convictions
based on factual errors, thereby contributing to the legitimacy and the
188 Id. at 2648 (plurality opinion).
189 Id. at 2649 (plurality opinion).
190 Id. (plurality opinion).
'91 Id. (plurality
192 Id. (plurality
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opinion).

Id. (plurality opinion).
Id. (plurality opinion).
'9' Id. (plurality opinion).
'9'
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"moral force of the criminal law."' 96 Justice Frankfurter declared that "[i]t
is the duty of the Government to establish... guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free
society-is a requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the
historic, procedural content of 'due process.' ' 197 While it is important to
note that the guilt beyond a reasonable doubt standard is tied to the criminal
justice system and that Hamdi was detained outside of that system
militarily, the core purpose of that standard is equally applicable in Hamdi's
case: the Government must meet a high burden of proof in order to
minimize the risk of error prior to the deprivation of the individual's liberty
interest. Thus, the idea of shifting that burden of proof off of the
Government and onto the accused stands in stark contrast to the notion of
fairness and accuracy which due process was designed to protect.
Justice O'Connor's holding in Hamdi spoke of the citizen-detainee's198
"fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions."'
Likewise, it is "fundamental" that the citizen's right to an opportunity to be
heard be granted in a "meaningful manner."' 199 It is true that under Justice
O'Connor's conception of this hearing, the citizen is entitled to an attorney
and to notice of the facts underlying his detention by the Government. Yet
the hearing appears to be neither fair nor meaningful if the most basic
attributes of our justice system are drastically altered. The danger is that,
conceivably, the Government might not have to offer any more information
than the alleged facts listed in the Mobbs Declaration before the burden
shifts to the citizen-detainee to prove his innocence.
The one argument, not made by Justice O'Connor, that could support
the two proposed evidentiary limitations is that when an American citizen is
captured on a remote foreign battlefield, as opposed to being captured
within United States borders, there exists a logical presumption that the
individual is indeed an enemy combatant. Thus, pursuant to the "open
courts rule" of Exparte Milligan, a citizen captured inside the United States
while he is plotting or engaging in terrorism against civilians might be
entitled to the full protections of the domestic criminal justice system.20 0
However, a citizen captured outside the United States while he is actively
opposing the United States military might be entitled to a hearing with less
procedural safeguards that determine his status as an enemy combatant. As
with the definition of the term "enemy combatant," the input of Congress
196 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
197 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
'9' Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648 (plurality opinion).

199 Id. (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972)).
See ExparteMilligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866).
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regarding the evidentiary requirements of the due process hearing would
provide added credence to the Court's opinion in Hamdi.
D. WHERE TO GO FROM HERE: MILITARY TRIBUNALS VERSUS A
FEDERAL TERRORISM COURT
1. Military Tribunals
In addition to the two changes in the evidentiary requirements of the
due process hearings, Justice O'Connor stated that "[t]here remains the
possibility that the standards we have articulated could be met by an
appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal. ' 0 '
Thus, in the plurality's opinion, the neutral decision-maker assessing the
merits of the citizen's enemy-combatant label may be a military tribunal
rather than a federal district court.20 2 Justice O'Connor noted that the
military's own regulations already require the use of military tribunals in a
situation where an enemy detainee claims prisoner-of-war status covered by
the Geneva Convention.203
Similarly to the two alterations in the
evidentiary requirements set forth by Justice O'Connor,2 °4 the concept of
using military tribunals to determine the enemy combatant status of a
citizen was likewise treated in a single paragraph in the opinion,
unsupported by any caselaw.2 °5 However, the idea of subjecting United
States citizens to military tribunals has been addressed by the Court in past
cases.
In Milligan, the Court examined the Civil War-era case of a United
States citizen tried and convicted before a military tribunal for actions
allegedly contravening the laws of war within the United States.20 6 The
Court held that Congress did not have the power to create military tribunals
when state courts were open.20 7
However, in Quirin, the Court
unanimously held that unlawful combatants could be subjected to military
tribunals for trial and punishment, even if they were United States
citizens. 208 Relying on Quirin, it appears that subjecting a citizen to a
military tribunal is not prohibited by the Constitution or precedent if that

201
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203

Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2651 (plurality opinion).
Id at 2651-52 (plurality opinion).
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204 See supra Part V.C.
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citizen is accused of being an unlawful, or enemy, combatant. Additionally,
the fact that Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat in Afghanistan
among members of the Taliban further justifies putting Hamdi to a military
tribunal in order to determine whether he was in fact an enemy combatant.
Use of a military tribunal would be far less reasonable if Hamdi, an
American citizen, were captured within the borders of the United States for
alleged crimes not involving the military, as in Rumsfeld v. Padilla.°9
Thus, a simple formula may be warranted: if the citizen is captured within
the United States in the midst of plotting or fighting against innocent
civilians, then he should be subject to the criminal justice system, but if the
citizen is captured outside the United States in a foreign zone of active
combat in which the military is engaged, then he should be subject to a
military tribunal.
However, the use of military tribunals to try and punish American
citizens is constitutionally dubious in view of several relevant provisions.
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution states, "The Trial of all Crimes, except in
Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury. ' '210 The Fifth Amendment
guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty without due
process of law. 21' The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to notice of
criminal charges,-the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury,
and the right to assistance from counsel.2 12 Thus, the Constitution limits the
Government's power to detain its citizens by guaranteeing procedural due
process. In Hamdi, the Government did not charge the citizen with any
crime, seeking to remove the detention from the reach of these
constitutional provisions.
On the other hand, a former counsel to President Nixon has argued that
the criminal justice system is simply not appropriate for terrorism cases.213
First, terrorism is fundamentally different from other crimes because
terrorist acts are not "legitimate acts of war under international law, but
rather must be regarded as war crimes or crimes against humanity. 2 14
209

124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).

In Padilla, the defendant, a United States citizen, was

apprehended upon arrival from Pakistan at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport subject to
a warrant in connection with the investigation into the 9/11 attacks. Id. at 2715. The
Supreme Court denied Padilla's habeas corpus petition on procedural grounds because the
petition named a respondent over which the district court had no jurisdiction. Id. at 2727.
210 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
211 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
212 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
213 John Dean, AppropriateJusticefor Terrorists: Using Military Tribunals Rather than
Criminal Courts, FindLaw's Legal Commentary, at http://writ.news.fmdlaw.com/dean/
20010928.html (Sept. 28, 2001).
214 Id. (quoting Spencer H. Crona & Neal A. Richardson, Justice for War Criminals of
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Second, criminal trials of terrorists are inefficient and costly.2 15 For
example, the two criminal trials of the foreign terrorists accused of the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center required thirteen months, hundreds of
witnesses, and over 1,000 exhibits.2 16
As Justice O'Connor mentioned, the basic structure and procedure of a
military tribunal was established in Army Regulation 190-8, governing the
use of military tribunals to determine whether a captured individual's status
is that of a prisoner of war or an unlawful combatant.2 17 The Regulation
states that the procedures contained therein are in accordance with Article 5
of the Third Geneva Convention.2 18 According to the Army Regulation, a
competent tribunal shall be composed of three commissioned officers, one
of which serves -as the recorder. 2 19 The Regulation provides that the
proceedings shall be held open, except if security would be compromised if
held open.220 The detainee shall be advised of his rights at the beginning of
the hearing and shall be allowed to attend all open sessions. 22 1 The detainee
shall be allowed to "call witnesses if reasonably available" and may
question witnesses called against them.222 Military witnesses are not
"reasonably available" if their commanders determine that "their
presence... would affect combat or support operations," in which case,
written statements may be substituted.2 23 Detainees have the right to testify,
but may not be compelled to do so. 22 4 The three-member tribunal shall
review the evidence at the conclusion of the hearing and determine by
majority vote the status of the individual. 225 Finally, a written report of the
tribunal's decision must be completed.226
Notably, these procedures do not call for the burden of proof to be
placed on the accused to prove that he is not an unlawful combatant, as
Invisible Armies: A New Legal and Military Approach to Terrorism, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REv. 349, 361 (1996)).
215
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Thus, these regulations

appear to be more fair to the citizen-detainee than Justice O'Connor's
conception of the due process hearing, in light of her alterations. A military
tribunal system, in which the citizen-detainee would be able to present
evidence and witnesses to rebut his enemy combatant label before three
legally trained judges, may comport with the requirements of due process as
envisioned by the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, in light of the Supreme Court
opinions in Hamdi and Rasul v. Bush,228 the military established military
tribunals to evaluate the enemy combatant status of foreign nationals being
detained at Guantanamo Bay. 229 The regulations governing the tribunals
follow much of the language of Army Regulation 190-8. They also take
into account Justice O'Connor's statement regarding hearsay evidence in
Hamdi:
The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence such as would apply in a court of
law. Instead, the Tribunal shall be free to consider any information it deems relevant
and helpful to a resolution of the issue before it. At the discretion of the Tribunal, for
example, it may consider hearsay evidence, taking into account the reliability of such
evidence in the circumstances.

However, the use of status review hearings before military tribunals
has already been called into question by a federal judge.23'
The idea of the need for an independent adjudicator in any proceeding
involving the Due Process Clause is relevant here.232 The right to an
independent adjudicator should be viewed as the primary consideration of
the adequacy of the process due the citizen because "[t]he rights to notice,
hearing, counsel, transcript, and to calling and cross-examining witnesses
all relate directly to the accuracy of the adjudicative process. ' '233 However,
"[t]hese procedural safeguards are of no real value.., if the decisionmaker
227
228

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2649 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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corpus petitions from non-citizens detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba).
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231 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 155 (D.D.C. 2004).
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bases his findings on factors other than his assessment of the evidence
before him., 234 For example, if a judge were a racist and the defendant
were an African American, the judge may never find for that defendant
despite the presence of all of the other procedural safeguards. 235 Similarly,
if the adjudicator is an integral part of the Government and the Government
is a party in the case, then it is possible that the Government would "be the
judge of its own case" and tilt heavily toward the Government's side in the
proceeding.236
Extending the argument to the case of military tribunals in Hamdi, the
emerging issue becomes whether military tribunals may ever truly act as
neutral and independent decision-makers. It is certainly arguable that if the
same military that captured Hamdi was also the adjudicator of his enemy
combatant status, then the findings might not be impartial, even if all other
procedural due process elements were in place. Judge Henry Friendly noted
that "as the independence of the decisionmaker increases, the need for other
procedural safeguards decreases., 237 In addition to actual fairness in the
due process hearing, the presence of an independent adjudicator bolsters
other values, such as the appearance of fairness, equality, predictability,
transparency, rationality, and the revelation of truth.238 Thus, Justice
O'Connor's alteration of elements of due process, such as the suspension of
the hearsay rules and the shifting of the burden from the Government to the
individual, 239 are dwarfed in comparison to the primacy of the independent
adjudicator in assuring the adequacy of due process.
In the final analysis, if the President or the military ultimately sought
to follow Justice O'Connor's lead and use military tribunals to determine
the status of a citizen-detainee such as Hamdi in a manner described above,
Congress should enter into the debate. In passing a statute, Congress could
weigh the competing constitutional interests involved, formalize a
procedure utilizing military tribunals, and further legitimize the idea by,
indirectly, ascribing the will of the people. However, it must be
remembered that only two United States citizens, Hamdi and John Phillip
Walker Lindh, have thus far been captured on a foreign battlefield, and
Lindh was subjected to the criminal justice system. Likely, the advantages
of using military tribunals, namely their efficiency, with regard to the
234
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hundreds of foreign nationals held at Guantanamo Bay waiting to have their
statuses reviewed, do not at this time outweigh the mandates of the
Constitution when dealing with the indefinite detention of American
citizens. Moreover, the legitimacy of such a proceeding before a military
tribunal may be called into question, considering the importance of a
neutral and independent decision-maker.
2. FederalTerrorism Court
When viewed in light of the need for an independent adjudicator,
subjecting United States citizens to military tribunals is likely inadequate to
comport with due process requirements. The proper place for the citizendetainee to get his day in court regarding his enemy combatant status
appears to be the federal court system. Yet, the exigencies of the War on
Terror require due consideration to both the secret intelligence involved in
such status hearings and the goals of the executive branch and the military
in prosecuting a war. Perhaps a new court could be established specifically
to appropriately take into account liberty and security. Professor Harvey
Rishikof has argued that a federal terrorism court is warranted.24 ° Congress
could establish a federal terrorism court under either Article I or Article
111.241 A federal trial court devoted exclusively to cases involving national
security could craft procedures that would deal effectively with secret
evidence without damaging the quality of United States intelligence by
divulging its sources. 242 Trained defense lawyers, with proper security
clearance, could serve in a similar manner to public defenders.243 Judges,
most likely Article III judges with life tenure, could be housed in a fortified
federal courthouse in Washington, D.C., or could travel abroad to places
like Guantanamo Bay to conduct hearings.2 44
A somewhat analogous federal court already exists in the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978245 created this federal court in order to authorize electronic
surveillance if there was probable cause to believe an individual to be a
member of a "foreign power," even if that individual was also an American

240 Harvey Rishikof, Is it Time for a Federal Terrorist Court?

Terrorists and

Prosecutions:Problems, Paradigms, andParadoxes, 8 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADvOC. 1,

4-5 (2003).
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citizen.
The Court consists of eleven federal judges with appropriate
security clearance and meets in secret to issue search orders.247
Employing a jury of the defendant's peers, as contemplated by the
Constitution, would likely be out of the question in cases dealing with
sensitive national security issues and intelligence. Yet, allowing the citizen
alleged to be an enemy combatant to put on a defense in federal court
before a federal judge advances the proceeding closer to Justice O'Connor's
ideal of a meaningful opportunity to contest the facts underlying the
citizen's detention before a neutral and independent decision-maker.
Therefore, through the creation of a federal terrorism court, the fairness of
the proceeding and the legitimacy of the result may be realized to a greater
extent than is possible in a proceeding before a military tribunal for reasons
discussed above in Part V.D. 1.
While the guarantee of fairness to the alleged enemy combatant
remains preeminent, Professor Thomas F. Powers has argued that a federal
terrorism court and statutory clarification of the process by which potential
enemy combatants are detained should be established in part for political
reasons. 24 In Hamdi, the Government set forth rather extreme arguments
that it possessed the unchecked authority to indefinitely detain anyone,
citizen or non-citizen, whom it labeled an enemy combatant, and no judicial
review was allowed. Nonetheless, Defense Department legal counsel
William Hayes insisted that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay received "a
rigorous review of the facts under which they were captured and detained,
as well as an interrogation process, a threat assessment process, a
psychological analysis, a check of background information, [and] a check of
law enforcement authorities., 249 But the rebuke of the Court has caused the
250
executive branch to take a more balanced view of security and liberty.
Congress must step in and clarify the review process of detainees by statute,
explicitly define the term "enemy combatant," and determine the maximum
time period that a detainee may be incarcerated before receiving a
hearing. 251 Additionally, Congress should establish a federal terrorism
court composed of Article III judges incorporating special security
252
measures to try alleged enemy combatants who dispute their status.
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Congressional action in these two areas would constitutionally legitimize
the actions undertaken by the Government and would act to neutralize the
criticism of civil libertarians.253 In the end, as Justice O'Connor aptly
reminded, our commitment to due process is currently being tested in
difficult times, yet that very commitment at home is, in part, the reason we
fight abroad.254
It is noteworthy that, rather than submit him to the due process hearing
before a neutral decision-maker as the Court mandated, the Government
released Yaser Esam Hamdi to Saudi Arabia, his homeland, on October 11,
2004.255 Thus, the Supreme Court may be forced to address the specifics of
such a hearing due a citizen such as Hamdi at some point in the future if
any United States citizens are captured in conjunction with a potentially
endless War on Terror.
VI. CONCLUSION

The result reached by the plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld was
correct. When a United States citizen is captured on the battlefield by the
United States military in conjunction with the War on Terror, the
Government may not label that individual an "enemy combatant" and
indefinitely detain him without access to a lawyer. The citizen's right to
due process guaranteed by the Constitution mandates that he be given a
meaningful hearing before a neutral decision-maker in which he may rebut
the underlying facts of his detention and "enemy combatant" label.
The Court correctly reasoned that the President was congressionally
authorized to detain citizen and non-citizen alike, once it has been
sufficiently established that the individual is indeed an enemy combatant.
However, the plurality opinion failed to adequately instruct lower courts
regarding the proper course in future factually similar cases. First, the
plurality opinion declined to define the term "enemy combatant." Second,
the plurality's use of the Mathews balancing test was improper given its
origins and the liberty interest involved in Hamdi. Third, the Court
neglected to outline a constitutionally acceptable procedure for determining
whether a citizen-detainee's enemy combatant status is accurate. Finally,
the plurality opined that military tribunals may be constitutionally
acceptable to fulfill the role of the neutral decision-maker. However, a new
federal terrorism court may ultimately be preferable. Since the fairness and
the constitutionality of the due process hearing is paramount to the
253 Id. at 25.
254 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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legitimacy of detaining citizen-enemy combatants in wartime, the Court's
failure on the four counts above leaves the outlook for United States
citizens disputing their detention in conjunction with the War on Terror
murky and ambiguous.
James B. Anderson
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